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INTRODUCTION

Having made the decision to use arbitration, parties are
tempted to consider the major issue in the negotiations settled.
The parties may then choose an arbitral institution by relying on
no more than familiarity with its name. Parties often adopt a set
of rules because of convenience without considering the implications of their choice. It is not until a dispute arises that the lacu.nae in the rules appear and the parties and counsel flounder. Too
* Partner, Battle, Fowler, Jatfin & Kheel, New York City. J.D. 1965, Univer-

sity of Texas School of Law; B.A. 1962, Rice University.
** J.D. 1984, Columbia Law School; A.B. 1976, Bryn Mawr.
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often an arbitration proceeding results in an unsatisfactory award
and the litigation that the parties originally wished to avoid is
commenced. The delays created by the need to resolve a multitude of intermediate disagreements before considering the primary dispute often sacrifices one of the main benefits of arbitration-its speed.
The purpose of this Article is to examine the pitfalls of international arbitration on a broad scale.1 These pitfalls can be roughly
grouped into two categories: (1) those endemic to the process of
dispute resolution by a "private extra-judicial tribunal which derives its power from the agreement of the parties,"2 including difficulties unforeseen in the drafting of the agreement that add delay, complications, and expense to the proceedings; and (2) those
related to using the rules of a particular institution. Ideally, planning and skillful drafting can eliminate both types of pitfalls and
preserve the advantages of arbitration over other available national judicial forums. The pitfalls inherent in institutional arbitration can be eliminated either by drafting provisions for ad hoc
arbitration or by drafting complementary provisions to the rules
of a chosen arbitral institution. Although the two categories of
pitfalls are related, this Article will treat them separately. The
initial focus will be on the choice of either ad hoc or institutional
arbitration. This Article will consider supplementing by contract
the rules of three of the major arbitral institutions: the American
Arbitration Association (AAA), the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC), and the UNCITRAL rules. The most useful
comparisons of the three bodies of rules 3 converge at several
1. See Higgins, Brown & Roach, Pitfalls in InternationalCommercial Arbitration, 35 Bus. LAW. 1035 (1980). The Higgins article examines the subject
from the viewpoint of supplementing the rules of the International Chamber of

Commerce (ICC), and states that "the observations are susceptible to broader
application." Id. at 1038. The ICC is a commonly chosen arbitration institution.

Its "pitfalls" and benefits are best illustrated by comparing the ICC rules to
those of other institutions and to ad hoc arbitration. This comparison, in addition to making the "pitfalls" more obvious, will highlight the questions to be
raised when drafting provisions to complement institutional rules and the goals

of such drafting.
2. Id. at 1036.
3. Several approaches have been advanced, but the methods converge on several basic subjects: the manner of submission to the chosen institution; the procedures stipulated, especially as they concern the establishment of terms of reference and the submission of evidence; the method of choosing arbitrators and,

as a subset, how the arbitrators are paid; the form of the award and its finality
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points: the method of submission to the institution; the selection
of arbitrators; the costs of the proceedings; the availability of provisional relief and antifrustration devices; the principles of procedure; the principles for determining applicable law; the form and
substance of the award; and the enforceability of the award.
The problems most often associated with international arbitration are easily categorized, thereby making the task of drafting an
agreement around the pitfalls much easier. The first category of
problems concerns the goals of the overall process. Arbitration
should be faster than adjudication in the court system, less expensive than more traditional litigation, and specifically adaptable to the particular problem before the tribunal. Arbitration,
however, is often slow, expensive, and unsuited to the dispute
considered.
The second category of problems are procedural in nature. Procedural pitfalls include the following: the validity and scope of
the submission clause; the unavailability of prescribed or familiar
methods of obtaining evidence; the order, timing, and manner of
pleading; the presentation of both lay and expert witness testimony; the method of proving a case, including documents, depositions, briefs, and testimony; the location and language of the arbitration proceedings; and the method of choosing applicable law.
One further procedural consideration is the prevention or creative
use of delaying tactics.
The third problem category is substantive. This category includes the choice of arbitrators, a decision crucial to the whole
proceeding and potentially determinative of applicable substantive and procedural law; the form of the award; and the vulneraand enforceability; the costs of the procedure; and time. One group has followed

another recommended approach, compiling statistics and information to support
their method. See HANDBOOK OF INSTITUTIONAL ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL
TRADE (E. Cohn, M. Domke & F. Eisemann eds. 1977). Recognizing the need for
a method of comparison between the available choices, the editors attempted to
gather information on the major arbitration centers around the world. They
chose a longer format with two major parts: (1) Statistical Information, which
includes a brief history of the proceedings, the number of proceedings handled
in the last year, the costs involved, and the percentage of awards followed; and
(2) Procedural Aspects, consisting of the arbitral agreement and its usual wording, resolution of jurisdictional conflicts, language problems and their resolution,
choice of the arbitrator, representation, principles of procedure, principles followed for the determination of applicable law, the authority of award, reasons
accompanying the award, unanimous or majority award, amiable compositeur,
decisions on costs, and availability of archives. Id. at xiii-xiv.
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bility of an award to review and attack by national courts that
want to refuse enforcement.
II.

THE CHOICE BETWEEN AD

Hoc

ARBITRATION AND

INSTITUTIONAL ARBITRATION

Initially, counsel and contracting parties must choose between
institutional arbitration, which allows a party to choose the rules
of a particular organization experienced in administering arbitrations, or ad hoc arbitration, which requires that the parties agree
on their own set of rules at the time of contract negotiation.
Drafting a contract provision for ad hoc arbitration can be a
long and drawn-out process. 4 Although this type of provision need
only contain an agreement to submit disputes to arbitration and a
method to appoint arbitrators,5 such a skeletal provision may
leave the parties in an untenable position when a dispute actually
arises. Fortunately, in 1976 the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) adopted a set of arbitration rules, drafted in consultation with leading experts, to replace
individually composed rules for use in ad hoc arbitration.'
4.

A basic provision for ad hoc arbitration should include at least the follow-

ing points:
1. the location of the proceedings;
2. the manner of choosing the tribunal;
3. the method of paying costs;
4. the governing procedural rules-either those of a chosen institution, the
domestic arbitration rules of the country in which the arbitration will be
held, the UNCITRAL rules, or those devised by the arbitral tribunal;
5. the applicable substantive law to be applied by the tribunal in interpreting the contract and establishing the rights of the parties-usually the
substantive law of a country related to the contract and not the law of the
country of any of the parties, or the law of the place of the arbitration.
Goekjian, ICC Arbitrationfrom a Practitioner'sPerspective, 14 J. INT'L LAW &
ECON. 487, 489 (1980).

Because the substantive law is a difficult negotiating point, the usual compromise is to not mention it at the proceedings. Maintaining this silence creates
another issue for the tribunal to decide and usually necessitates a preliminary
hearing. Another compromise is to insert the phrase "customary rules of equity
and international commerce" into the agreement. This standard, however, gives
so much discretion to the tribunal that it may endanger the enforceability of the
award, especially in countries that require awards to be based on legal standards. Id. at 411-12.
5. Deciding only the method of appointing arbitrators is attractive when the
parties have so many other facets of a contractual relationship to resolve.
6. U.N. Committee on International Trade Law, 31 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
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A. The UNCITRAL Rules
In a sense, the UNCITRAL rules are a halfway house between
ad hoc arbitration and institutional arbitration. Parties may
choose to adopt the UNCITRAL rules simply by designating in
the contract that the rules govern the resolution of disputes. The
UNCITRAL rules may also be applied in institutional arbitration.
Provisions for third party assistance when the parties cannot
agree are available in a limited number of locations.7 The AAA
has announced that it is prepared to administer arbitration under
UNCITRAL rules and has recently published administrative
rules for this purpose.8 UNCITRAL is considering, and is likely to
issue, its own guidelines encouraging more arbitration associations to "offer their services in this context." 9
The UNCITRAL rules are presented as model provisions to be
incorporated into contracts and are subject to mandatory provisions of applicable arbitration law. 10 In response to the disparities
in arbitration law and to its limited focus on domestic arbitration,
UNCITRAL has requested that the Secretariat draft a model law
on arbitral procedure' as a supplement to the United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. 2 The Secretariat is to design the model law specifically for international cases to lessen the impact of domestic law
that might govern the arbitration simply because of the situs of
the arbitration hearings.13 At present, however, the UNCITRAL
17) at 34, U.N. Doc. A/31/17 (1976) [hereinafter cited as UNCITRAL Rules],
reprinted in G. WILNER, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBrrRATION app. XI (rev. ed.
1984) [hereinafter cited as WILNER].
7. Suy, Achievements of the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law, 15 INT'L LAW. 139 (1981).
8.

Id. at 143.

9. Id.
10. For example, arbitration in the United States is subject to the provisions
of Title 9 - Arbitration, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-208 (1982); arbitration in France is subject to the provisions of French Decree No. 81-500, May 12, 1981, 1981 Journal
Officiel de la R16publique Frangais [J.O.] 1380, 1981 Dalloz-Sirey, Lggislation
[D.S.L.] 222 (amending the Code of Court Procedure). Arbitration also can be
subject to various multinational conventions such as the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter cited as
New York Convention].
11. Suy, supra note 6, at 143.
12. New York Convention, supra note 10.
13. "The arbitration site, in turn, may have been chosen because of the
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rules are no freer of domestic law than are any of the other institutional rules.
Although adoption of the well-drafted UNCITRAL procedural
rules may be helpful, more is needed to ensure the satisfactory
outcome of an arbitral proceeding. Even if the parties approach
the proceeding with good faith, a referee may still be helpful at
times. For example, if the parties have not named a sole arbitrator in advance of the proceeding, an arbitrator cannot perform at
the time of the dispute. In addition, if the parties cannot agree on
a third arbitrator, the arbitration breaks down. A solution is to
designate a referee to step in and restore order. Thus, the UNCITRAL rules provide for the naming of an "appointing
'14
authority.
B.

Factors to Consider Before Making the Choice

An arbitration may take place in counsel's office, a hotel room,
or a restaurant. The crucial point to remember about the ad hoc
arbitration structure is that all of the administrative details are
left to the parties. In international arbitration, such details may
include translation of documents and testimony, which may be
cumbersome and expensive.
Arbitral institutions often are better equipped than the parties
to provide the basic necessities of arbitration, including rooms,
translators, and secretarial services. This reason alone may be
sufficient to make institutional arbitration the more sensible
choice. To be sure, parties will pay for the conveniences of institutional arbitration; however, not having to make these arrangements might be well worth the fee. Institutions also offer technical expertise to facilitate the making of an award and to ensure
its ultimate enforcement. Some countries are less than ideal hosts
for arbitrations because of local legal peculiarities. An award may
also be subject to certain form requirements imposed by national
law to be enforceable.1 5 Furthermore, although arbitral institu-

pleasant climate, excellent hotels or the neutrality of a given state. Yet, as one
arbitrator once put it, the mere fact that a country was not engaged in a war for
four hundred years does not necessarily make its law more suitable or relevant
to the international case arbitrated within its borders." Suy, supra note 6, at
143.
14. UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 6, arts. 6-7.
15. Awards may be vulnerable even under the New York Convention, which
was written to ensure and facilitate enforcement between signatories. Grounds
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tions do not usually play a role in determining the merits of an
individual dispute, these organizations may have records on hand
that can serve as a type of precedent to guide the arbitrators. The
ICC staff reviewing a draft award may suggest that the arbitrators have missed some aspect of the case or that the decision is
out of line with similar cases.1 6 The ICC also offers assistance in
17
enforcement of arbitral awards.
The choice of ad hoc arbitration over institutional arbitration
highlights all three categories of problems-the problems of the
process itself, the procedural problems, and the substantive
problems-in a particularly acute manner simply because the entire process is up to the parties. Singling out the possible savings
of institutional fees as the decisive factor in making the arbitration choice could be a grave error. Once the decision to pursue
institutional arbitration has been made, the process of selecting
the most appropriate rules involves analyzing the various provisions for inherent pitfalls. Counsel should be familiar enough with
the rules of arbitration to choose those most appropriate for his
client's particular circumstances and particular negotiations.
III.

SUBMISSION CLAUSES

The AAA, ICC, and UNCITRAL rules recommend the insertion of their respective standard submission clauses into a contract.1 ' The language of these clauses suggests that the first probfor refusing enforcement include the invalidity of the agreement under the applicable law as selected by the parties or, if the parties made no selection, "the

composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with ... the law of the country where the arbitration took place." New
York Convention, supra note 10, art. V, para. 1(a), (d). In addition, enforcement
may be refused if the award was not binding, id. at para. 1(e), was contrary to
public policy, or the subject matter of the dispute was not arbitrable under the
applicable law. Id. at para. 2. Challenges based on most of these grounds, however, are seldom successful. See Sanders, A Twenty Years' Review of the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 13 INT'L LAW. 269, 270
(1979).
16. Stevenson, An Introduction to ICC Arbitration,14 J. INT'L LAW & ECON.
381, 387 (1980).
17. Goekjian, supra. note 4, at 429.
18. These clauses are drawn broadly. The AAA would have its submission
clause apply "whenever [the parties] have provided for arbitration by the
[AAA]." Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association
(amended 1982) [hereinafter cited as AAA rules], rule 1, reprinted in WINNR,
supra note 6, app. VII. UNCITRAL would have its rules apply to "[a]ny dis-
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lem usually encountered in any arbitral proceeding is the validity
and scope of the submission clause. The most common question is
whether or not the language of the clause applies to a claim of
fraud in the inducement of a contract containing an arbitration
clause.'
In the landmark case of Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin,20 the Supreme Court held that the language "any controversy
or claim arising out of or relating to this agreement or the breach
thereof" under the Federal Arbitration Act 2 was broad enough to
include the charge of fraud in the inducement of the contract.2 2
As exemplified by a recent New York case, 23 the language "or relating to" appears crucial in lower courts' application of Prima
Paint. In Michele Amoruso E. Figli,24 fraud was alleged in the
inducement of both the contract itself and the arbitration
clause. 5 Citing PrimaPaint,the court found that both questions
of fraud were for the court to decide because the arbitration
clause, by omitting the "or relating to" language, was not broad
enough to cover the situation.2 6
Although the language of the ICC submission clause may be
slightly broader than that of the AAA clause, French law is consistent with the United States position on the charge of fraud in
the inducement of a contract. French courts, however, have decided that in international arbitration, the arbitration clause is
severable from the main contract, empowering the arbitrators to

pute, controversy or claim arising out of or relating to [the] contract." UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 6, Model Arbitration Clause. The ICC clause would
cover "[a]ll disputes arising in connection with the present contract." Rules for
International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration (effective 1980) [hereinafter cited as ICC Rules], Standard ICC Arbitration Clause, reprinted in W".NER, supra note 6, app. XIII.

19. There are, of course, many other "initial" problems, but the focus of this
paper is a comparison of the rules of three major arbitration institutions. This
focus limits the discussion here to problems raised by the submission clauses
suggested in the different sets of rules.
20. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
21. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
22. 388 U.S. at 406.
23.

Michele Amoruso E. Figli v. Fisheries Dev. Corp., 499 F. Supp. 1074

(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
24. Id. at 1079.
25. Id. at 1080.
26. SociUt6 Gosset C. Soci~t6 Carapelli, May 7, 1963, Courde cassation, Pre-

mi6re section civile, Fr., 1963 Dalloz, Jurisprudence [D. Jur.] 545.

Winter 1984]

PITFALLS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION

decide the validity of the contract as a whole.27 The "in connection with" language of the ICC clause2 s would certainly pass this
initial hurdle in French courts. Furthermore, under ICC rules, the
Court of Arbitration may determine the existence of an agreement to arbitrate.2 9
The UNCITRAL version of the submission clause 31 seems to
cover all possibilities. Its sweeping coverage, however, suggests
another problem to consider at the drafting stage. In any contractual relationship, one of the parties may not want to submit certain acts to arbitration. For example, a party may not want to
leave the issue of statutory rights to the arbitrators. A more narrowly drafted clause may specify that disputes arising out of only
certain provisions of the agreement will be submitted to arbitration. By restricting the type of disputes that an arbitral tribunal
can adjudicate, costs may be limited and delays avoided.
Although the use of the standardized clauses may provide some
security that the dispute will be decided before an arbitral panel
and not before a national court judge, the use of standbrd clauses
leaves the parties completely in the hands of the designated institution because the rules of arbitration are incorporated by reference. The rules, however, are not always appropriate for the particular dispute between the parties. For this reason it is best that
counsel understand the rules of the chosen institution, decide
what changes are needed, and include the necessary changes in
the submission clause.
The drafting of a clause which submits disputes to arbitration
ideally should take into account the types of disputes likely to
arise under the contract and the position of the parties at the
time of the dispute. The problems to which the arbitration clause
should be responsive will vary with the type of dispute. The controlling questions, however, should be why arbitration was chosen
initially; what the arbitration expected to accomplish;31 and the
extent to which the institutional or specially drafted arbitration
rules protect those goals. Counsel should consider what gaps must
27. See supra note 18.

28. ICC Rules, supra note 18, art. 8; see also Higgins, supra note 1, at 1038.
29. ICC Rules, supra note 18, art. 8.
30. See supra note 18.

31. Possible goals include speed of resolution, confidentiality of proceedings,

availability of technical experts to decide the merits of the dispute, and freedom
from possible national prejudice.
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be filled because the rules allow parties to supplement procedures
by agreement. The overall focus of any drafting, therefore, should
be the arbitration process itself; thereafter, procedural and substantive problems may be addressed both on their own merits and
in light of the objectives of speed of resolution, cost savings of
alternatives, efficiency in problem solving, and suitability to foreseeable disputes.
IV.

SELECTION OF THE ARBITRATORS

The choice of arbitrators is perhaps the most crucial part of
any arbitral proceeding ("L'Arbitrate vaut ce que vaut
32 Once the proceedings begin, the sole
l'arbitre").
arbitrator or
the arbitral tribunal is in charge. Any aspect of the arbitration
that the parties or the institutional rules have left to chance is in
the arbitrator's hands.33 Because not every contingency can be
addressed in a contract, significant control may rest in the arbitrator's discretion and judgment. Although at first glance the
choice of an arbitrator presents procedural problems that are in
many cases outcome dispositive, the choice is really substantive.
Each of the three bodies of institutional rules has provisions on
the procedure for choosing an arbitrator. Within these rules, however, the parties have wide latitude to designate their own procedures. 4 Short of designating specific individuals and substitutes
at the time of contract negotiations, the drafted provision should
indicate the number of arbitrators to be appointed, any particular
or approximate qualifications needed (especially if the contract
calls for technical expertise), and the language that will govern
the proceedings.3 5 In the case of ICC rules it is generally contemplated that the governing language will be found in the contract if
no other language is indicated. Many contractual deals, especially
those with the People's Republic of China, have contracts written
32. Eisemann, The PartisanArbitrator in InternationalArbitration,Semi-

nar on Commercial Arbitration 37 (New Delhi 1968); see also Higgins, supra
note 1, at 1043.
33. For an example of the explicit provision that casually grants this sweeping authority, see AAA Rules, supra note 18, art. 53.
34. See generally Aksen, A Practical Guide to InternationalArbitration,
Problems and Solutions in InternationalBusiness in 1975, 1976 PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD, Sw. LEGAL FouND. 51.
35. See McClelland, International Arbitration: A Practical Guide to the
System for the Litigation of Transnational Commercial Disputes, 17 VA. J.
INT'L L. 729, 742 (1977).
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in the languages of both parties.
Parties may decide to have a single arbitrator. In this case,
draftsmen should adopt institutional rules that allow the parties
some input in the selection process. Without special provisions,
choosing the arbitrator will be left up to the institution. The importance of maintaining this control goes to the heart of choosing
arbitration over litigation. In most national forums, there is little
or no control over which particular judge will hear a case at trial;
one of the goals of arbitration is to remove some of this uncertainty.36 Most international arbitrations, however, are conducted
by panels of three arbitrators-the two party-appointed arbitrators and a chief, chairman, or presiding arbitrator chosen either
by the party arbitrators or by the arbitral institution.
If three arbitrators are to be selected, it is important to consider whether the party arbitrators should take the role of advocates on the panel or whether they should be neutral.37 The prevailing custom in international arbitrations is for the party-

appointed arbitrators to be completely impartial. Enough doubt
about this custom exists, however, that the parties may provide

otherwise.3 s
To avoid future criticism and to guard against challenges, parties should define the scope of permissible communications be-

36. It could be argued that predictability of the outcome is sacrificed for the
speed of arbitration. Courts apply predictable laws in a more or less consistent
manner. Arbitration, however, is much less predictable because it is so dependent on the personalities, idiosyncracies, and individual backgrounds of the
members of the tribunal. In addition, the choice of law, whether that of a particular country, lex mercatoriaor ex aequo et bono decreases the parties' control of
the process. Careful selection of arbitrators, along with other controls that can
be written into an arbitration agreement may substantially reduce that risk.
37. Under United States law, the party-appointed arbitrators do not have to
be neutral. Section 10 of 9 U.S.C., however, does cite "partiality or corruption"
of the arbitrators as grounds for vacating an award. See Aksen, supra note 33, at
64-65.
38. Aksen, supra note 33, at 65. Because most international arbitrations are
conducted before an impartial tribunal, an arbitrator who is employed by one of
the parties, has a financial interest in the outcome, or is related to or in some
other way associated with the party appointing him, can usually be challenged.
This would certainly delay the proceedings, and in some instances, take the
power of appointment away from the party and give it to the administrative
authority. If an opposing party was originally unaware of the grounds for disqualification and failed to make the challenge until after the award, the national
courts of most jurisdictions would declare the award invalid because a member
of the tribunal was not impartial. Cf. 9 U.S.C. § 10, (1982).

30

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 17:19

tween the party arbitrator and the neutral arbitrator, the ex
parte communications between the party arbitrator and the neutral arbitrator, and the communications between the party and
his arbitrator. Furthermore, if parties wish to provide for neutral
arbitrators, the procedure for paying the arbitrators' fees may undermine any bite in the neutrality requirement. The method of
payment may raise the following questions: (1) should a neutral,
party-appointed arbitrator be paid directly by a party; (2) should
the fee be identical for each party arbitrator; (3) is the matter
resolved by using the arbitral institution as a conduit to clear the
checks; and (4) should the parties make prior arrangements to set
identical fees, deposit the money with the institution or some presiding body, and pay the arbitrators out of a common pool? Prior
to appointing the arbitrators, the parties also should specify the
standards of disclosure for the arbitrators and the factors that
call for an arbitrator's removal upon the request of the parties. 9
A nonneutral arbitrator appears to contradict the purpose of
the arbitration process itself. The tactical advantage of having a
skillful advocate on the panel cannot be superior to having skilled
counsel argue the case before an impartial panel. A two-tiered
system of party representation can prolong the proceedings and
sacrifice the efficiency and expediency of the arbitration. Although the added assurance that the case will be completely
presented after the hearings and in the deliberations may be a
psychological advantage, this assurance can be more efficiently
built into other provisions governing the arbitration. 0
Compared to the other institutions' rules, the AAA rules provide the parties with the most control over the arbitrator selection process, even if the Association itself actually appoints the
arbitrators. The parties eliminate unacceptable arbitrators from
the group presented by the AAA and order by preference those
arbitrators remaining on the list. The AAA chooses the arbitrators from the remaining names "in accordance with the desig39.

The AAA has published a code of ethics for arbitrators that provides

insight into the perceived differences between neutral and non-neutral arbitrators and the consequent restrictions on their behavior during the hearings. CODE
OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATION IN COMMERCIAL DisPUTs (American Arbitration
Ass'n and American Bar Ass'n 1977), reprinted in WxINER, supra note 6, app.

XIV.
40. For a thorough discussion of the issue, see McLaughlin, Selecting Arbi-

trators and Counsel, Seminar in InternationalCommercialArbitration,Section
E; see also Higgins, supra note 1, at 1043-44.
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nated order of mutual preference.

41

The ICC, however, will de-

cide on the arbitrators if the parties fail to agree on or nominate
arbitrators. The ICC Court of Arbitration may select arbitrators
from national committees of countries other than those of the
parties to the dispute. The Court must confirm the arbitrators,
but its standards and deliberations are private and final.
The ICC rules provide for independent party-appointed arbitrators, 42 and its payment provisions are consonant with this requirement. The Court, however, chooses the third or presiding arbitrator, in contrast to the AAA rules under which the partyappointed arbitrators pick the third member of the tribunal. The
Court is also the sole judge of challenges,43 but, unlike the AAA
rules, ICC rules have no guidelines for disclosures that establish a
minimum basis for such challenges.
Section two of the UNCITRAL rules provides for the intervention of either a party-designated "appointing authority" or one
appointed by the Secretary General of the Permanent Court. The
challenge provisions 44 point toward neutral arbitrators, but if the
parties wish otherwise, any contract provision that names nonneutral arbitrators will govern.45 A sole arbitrator may be appointed by agreement of the parties, or the parties may designate
an appointing authority to do S0.46 If three arbitrators are to be
impaneled, each party selects one, and the two arbitrators chosen
appoint the presiding arbitrator.47 In addition, the UNCITRAL
rules provide that, unless otherwise agreed upon, the tribunal
makes the decision on the language or languages to use in the
proceedings and orders the necessary translations. 48 This provi-

sion could be an unpleasant surprise if not anticipated because
the expense of translation is often considerable. The expense of
translation involved may explain the repetition of the language
"subject to agreement of the parties" that begins this rule. This
language serves as a red flag to those parties who only give the
rules a cursory glance before incorporating them into an
agreement.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

AAA Rules, supra note 18, rule 13.
ICC Rules, supra note 18, Arbitration art. 2(4).
Id., art. 2(7).
UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 6, arts. 9-12.
Id. art. 1(1).
Id. art. 6.
Id. art. 7.
Id. art. 17.
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Although each set of institutional rules has some advantages,
the above review should point out the importance of selecting the
arbitrators and the dangers of placing blind faith in institutional
rules. Each choice with respect to the appointment and duties of
arbitrators is outcome determinative as much as it is a part of the
mechanics of arbitration.
The institutional rules can be used as an outline of the considerations to weigh in drafting a selection procedure. Any welldrafted contract provision should designate the number of arbitrators, their special qualifications, the language of the proceedings, the method of selecting each arbitrator including the tiebreaking provisions, the neutrality or nonneutrality of the arbitrators, the provisions for challenges and their resolution, and the
replacement of successfully challenged arbitrators. No one set of
rules covers all of these topics. Depending on the nature of the
dispute and, of course, the amount of control that a party wishes
to exercise over the arbitration proceedings, the considerations
listed may be too complete or too sketchy. The importance of the
choice of an arbitrator, however, cannot be overstated; if time is
to be spent anywhere in the drafting of arbitration provisions, it
should be spent at this stage.
V.

COSTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS

Reliance on the phrase "cheaper than litigation" with respect
to the costs of arbitration somehow implies just "cheap," which is
often not the case. Because most arbitrations are basically adversary proceedings, any expectation of great savings may be illfounded. Knowledge of the chosen institution's fee schedule may
modify expectations, provide some guidance, and induce the parties to narrow the types of disputes brought before the arbitral
panel, especially when an institution's fees are based on a percentage of the amount in dispute.
The AAA cost provisions are set out in rules 48 through 52.,"
The schedule by which administrative costs are calculated begins
with a minimum of $200, or three percent of a claim between $1
and $40,000, and goes to a maximum of $1800 plus one-quarter
percent of any amount over $160,000. In claims over $5,000,000,
the AAA has the power to set an "appropriate fee.

' 50

Neutral ar-

49. AAA Rules, supra note 18, rules 48-52.
50. Id. Administrative Fee Schedule, reprinted in WMNER, supra note 6,
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bitrators appointed from the national panel serve "in most cases
without fee,"" 1 for a fee agreed to by the parties, or for a fee set
by the AAA as "appropriate." In contrast, the ICC is expensive
with a minimum fee of $1,000, or four percent of claims under
$50,000. The fee schedule does not drop to AAA-level percentages
until the claim rises to between $1,000,000 and $2,000,000. Arbitrator's fees similarly are set by a schedule based on the amount
of the claim.2 In UNCITRAL arbitration, the tribunal sets the
fees.5 Although under AAA and ICC rules the parties divide the
costs, under UNCITRAL rules, the unsuccessful party must pay
unless the arbitral tribunal decides that apportionment is reasonable. 4 The fees are to be reasonable in light of "the amount of
the dispute, the complexity of the subject matter, the time spent
by the arbitrator and any other relevant circumstances of the
case."' 5 Such a provision seems overbroad. If the parties choose
UNCITRAL rules and are able to administer the proceedings
themselves, they may have some control over the costs; but if an
administrative authority assists, its fee schedule will govern. Any
real control over costs, therefore, must come at the drafting stage.

VI. AVAILABILITY OF PRovsIoNAL RELEF AND ANTFRUSTRATION
DEVICES
The New York Convention5 6 contains no express provisions for
pre-award attachments, a type of provisional relief in arbitration.57 Although the legislative history is sketchy, article II can be
viewed as including such measures as attachment under the dis-

app. VII at 56.
51. Id. rule 51. In spite of rule 51, most neutral arbitrators get paid.
52. ICC Rules, supra note 18, app. HI, reprinted in WruNER, supra note 6,
app. XIII, at 157-60.

53.

UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 6, art. 38.

54. Id. art. 40(1).
55. Id. art. 39(1).
56. New York Convention, supra note 10.
57. See Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex, 451 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Cal.
1977), "The Convention and its implementing statutes contain no reference to
prejudgment attachment . . . ." Some cases, however, state that although the
Convention does not refer to provisional relief, neither does it proscribe such

measures. See, e.g., Cooper v. Ateliers de la Motobecane, S.A., 86 A.D.2d 568,
569-70, 446 N.Y.S.2d 297, 299 (1982); Atlas Chartering Serv., Inc. v. World
Trade Group, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 861, 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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cussion of "suitable security. ' 58 Commentators are split on this
issue of provisional relief: some argue that the necessary involvement of national courts undermines the purpose and effect of the
Convention, while others posit that it is an "effective means of
enforcing an arbitral award." 59 Recent court decisions and the
rules of the ICC and UNCITRAL support the argument that the
Convention allows provisional relief.6 0 Resolution of the question
will determine whether the parties may provide for interim relief
within their contract without violating the agreement to arbitrate,
waive their right to arbitrate, or create additional grounds for
challenging the award.
A.

Pre-award Attachment

Foreign courts have upheld the jurisdiction of courts over the
pre-award attachment question, but have left resolution of the
dispute on the merits in the arbitrators' hands.6 United States
courts that enforce the Convention through its implementing legislation62 have handled the issue in two ways. The first method
involves a strict reading of the relevant statutory language. Under
this reading, such attachment action is barred63 as an "impermissible attempt to 'bypass' the agreement to arbitrate. ' ' " Other district courts, however, have rejected this reading of the Convention
and have found that neither the Convention nor the Federal Arbitration Act precludes pre-award attachment. 5 The power to
compel arbitration, granted to courts by section 4 of the Act, does
not deprive courts of continuing jurisdiction.6 Admiralty courts
have applied a policy-oriented approach to the controversy by

58. Holmes, Pre-Award Attachment Under the U.N. Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 21 VA. J. INT'L L.
785, 790-91 (1981).
59. Id. at 792 (quoting G. DELAUME, TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS: APPLICABLE
LAW AND SETTLEMENT OF DispuTEs 85 (1975)).
60. ICC Rules, supra note 18, art. 8(5); UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 6, art.

26(3).
61. See Holmes, supra note 57, at 794-95.
62. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1982).
63. See, e.g., McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. CEAT S.P.A., 501 F.2d 1032
(3d Cir. 1974).

64. Holmes, supra note 57, at 798 (citing McCreary, 501 F.2d at 1038).
65.

Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex, 451 F. Supp. 1044, 1051-52 (N.D.

Cal. 1977).
66. Id. at 1052; see Holmes, supra note 58, at 799.
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reading section 8 of the Act, which expressly provides for preaward attachment in admiralty cases, in harmony with the
Convention.6
The UNCITRAL rules provide for provisional relief. Article 26
gives the arbitral tribunal broad powers to take any necessary
measures regarding the subject matter of the dispute. Section 3 of
that same article provides that any party's application to a judicial authority for interim measures "shall not be deemed incompatible with the agreement to arbitrate, or as a waiver of that
agreement. '68 Although not dispositive, these provisions lend
strong support to the argument that pre-award attachments are
consistent with the overall purpose and policies of the Convention
because of UNCITRAL's connection with the United Nations and
the Commission's goal of providing rules that are specifically tailored for the resolution of international disputes.
Under the ICC rules, parties are allowed to apply to any competent judicial authority for interim or conservatory measures
before the file is transmitted to the arbitrator and the arbitration
begins. In addition, an application may be made in "exceptional
circumstances even thereafter" without being found to have "infringe[d] the agreement to arbitrate or to [have] affect[ed] the
relevant powers of the arbitrator. ' 69 The ICC rules, however, do
not provide the arbitrators with similar powers. Nevertheless, an
arbitrator could receive the application power from parties who
want to ensure that the option of asking the courts for interim or
provisional relief if a provision similar to that found in the UNCITRAL rules is included in the contract. Rule 34 of the AAA allows an arbitrator to take procedural measures to safeguard property that is the subject matter of arbitration.7 0 Rule 47(a) states
that "[n]o judicial proceedings by a party relating to the subject
matter of the arbitration shall be deemed a waiver of the party's
right to arbitrate."' 71 This provision gives support to courts that
believe provisional relief relates to the merits of the dispute,
under the rationale that the provision would take away what was
given by adoption of the rules-an illogical reading. How far this

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Holmes, supra note 58, at 800-01.
UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 6, art. 26(3).
ICC Rules, supra note 18, art. 8(5).
AAA Rules supra note 18, rule 34.
Id. rule 47(a).
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can be stretched, however, depends on the particular
conclusion
2
7

court.

B. Delaying Tactics
Another problem in this area concerns provisions in the rules
that deal with delaying tactics used to stall or disrupt arbitration
proceedings. Delaying tactics are easily used in five identifiable
stages of the arbitration process. Parties should keep these stages
in mind when drafting to prevent potential stalling or, if desirable
and possible, to leave room for maneuvering.73
In the first stage, the drafting stage, disputes can be as numerous and varied as the possible permutations of the number of provisions being drafted. It may be advisable, therefore, to confine
redrafting or complementary provisions to a few crucial clauses,
rather than rewriting all of the rules. This may be the strongest
argument for choosing institutional over ad hoc arbitration.
The second stage in which delaying tactics may be used occurs
when a dispute has arisen. This is the first test of an arbitration
clause and, in the case of institutional arbitration, the first test of
the institution's efficiency in countering any delaying tactics.
Common techniques used to delay at this stage are: (1) claiming
that neither the notice nor the claim was received; (2) contesting
the validity of the arbitration proceeding itself; (3) claiming that
the matter in dispute falls outside the scope of the agreement; (4)
contesting the existence of a dispute at all; (5) charging that the
claim is incomplete or needs amplification; (6) refusing to contribute to the down payment for the costs of the arbitration; (7) failing to appoint an arbitrator; (8) challenging the other party's arbitrators; (9) disputing the number of arbitrators; (10) delaying
the appointment of lawyers; (11) appointing additional lawyers
and demanding additional preparation time; and (12) raising
questions about language. Many of these tactics are effectively
precluded from use by provisions within the rules; others can be
met by drafting and agreeing upon procedural parries in advance.
Because delays can be expensive, cost should be considered when
dealing with delaying tactics once the tribunal is empaneled and
the "meter is running." In addition, remedies for certain procedu72. Holmes suggests in his article that pre-award attachments should not be
allowed "[u]ntil the United Nations elects to solve the problem by means of an
explicit interpretive ruling." See Holmes, supra note 58, at 801.
73. It may not be an advantage to rid the process of all possible delay.
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ral delays, such as claims of defective notice, incompleteness of
claims, and refusals to choose arbitrators, always must address
the substantive effects of any attempt to fight an opposing party's
action questioning the fairness of the proceeding. Obtaining a victory in getting the process started could later turn into defeat if
enforcement of the award is denied because the proceeding violated the substantive rights of one of the parties.
The third identifiable stage is during the arbitration itself when
many of the delaying tactics of the second stage can be used. Furthermore, at this stage, disagreements on procedure can be raised,
new challenges to the choice of arbitrators asserted, disputes on
time limits initiated, evidence disputed, and appeals taken to
courts in order to block the arbitration proceeding.
Disagreements among members of the arbitral tribunal also can
delay the procedure. The most common disagreements center on
independence of party-appointed arbitrators and the participation or nonparticipation of an arbitrator in deliberation. In some
cases, an arbitrator may be forced to withdraw before an award is
rendered.
Delay also can occur in the execution and enforcement of an
award. Intervention of a court may be called for by one of the
parties at several of the stages. Issues asserted before the courts
include designation of the arbitrators, the scope of the arbitration, the arbitration agreement itself, the extension of a time limit
to render the award, the measures enforcing provisional orders,
assistance in taking evidence and appointing experts, the deposit
and notification of an award, and the declarations of enforceability. Furthermore, courts will need to intervene if one party has to
force the other party to comply with the award.7 4
Antifrustration devices inserted in the initial contract must not
interfere with the ultimate enforceability of an award by contradicting mandatory provisions of applicable local law. The basic
dilemma is to avoid leaving too much to the discretion of the arbitrators without destroying the flexibility of the arbitral setting
or the speed with which a dispute can be resolved. To the extent
that delay can be used to obtain a tactical advantage or to harrass
opponents, any contract-regulated arbitration proceeding should
provide time limits from which the parties can deviate only upon
74. The preceding discussion appears in a presentation by Dr. Robert Briner,
ProceduralProblems, ICC SEMINAR PAPER, sec. G (copies of the paper are on file
with the authors and the VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.).
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circumscribed showings. 76 Because of the necessarily personal nature of arbitration, however, the incentive to delay and harrass
may be adequately policed by the hesitation of the parties to annoy the tribunal.
VII.
A.

PRINCIPLES OF PROCEDURE

Issue Determination

An important part of any arbitral procedure is framing the issues in conjunction with determining the degree of participation
accorded to the parties. The AAA rules provide that the arbitrator "may, at the beginning of the hearing, ask for statements clarifying the issues involved. ' 7' The UNCITRAL rules are silent on
the determination of the issues, but the ICC does have an extensive rule on drawing up the terms of reference 7 7 and places the
tribunal in control of both a "summary of the parties' respective
2' 9
claims '17 8 and the "definition of the issues to be determined.
The ICC rules give the arbitrator discretion to permit the parties
to participate in this issue formulation process.8 0 In addition, the
ICC's terms of reference may include the particulars of the applicable procedural rules and authorize the power of the arbitrator
to act as amiable compositeur8 s
The terms of reference can be quicksand for the parties because
the terms may include a statement of the issues that could be
drawn up by the arbitrators alone. The possibility of losing control of the proceedings is a real one, especially considering the
reference provision in conjunction with article 19 in which the
chairman of the panel is empowered to make an award if no majority agreement is reached. Even if the terms of reference are in
practice drawn up by the parties, 2 the arbitral agreement should

75. All of the rules have time limits attached to the filing of claims, answers,
and the announcement of the award itself. See, e.g., time limits for filing answers, AAA Rules, supra note 18 rule 7(b); ICC Rules, supra note 18, art. 4;
UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 6, art. 19.
76. AAA Rules, supra note 18, rule 29.
77. ICC Rules, supra note 18, art. 13(1).
78. Id. art. 13(1)(c).

79. Id. art. 13(1)(d).
80. Those reading the rules critically will note the importance of the selection process. The choice of the arbitrators is central to the entire system.
81.
82.

ICC Rules, supra note 18, art. 13(1)(g).
See Briner, supra note 74.
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include a provision to ensure this participation in issue
determination.
The AAA rules seemingly leave the determination of the issues
to the parties."' The rules make it clear that the arbitrators do
not have control over the issues; the parties should handle any
redefining or "clarification. ' 8 4 Rule 29 also contains more specific
provisions for the general procedure of framing the issues. The
rule states that the claimant should present his claims, proofs,
and witnesses, after which the defending party is to present his
complete case, subject to the discretion of the arbitrator.8 5 The
arbitrator may vary the order of presentation, but he must "afford full and equal opportunity to all parties for the presentation
of any material or relevant proofs."8' 6 The terms "material" or
"relevant" are not defined in the AAA rules. Article 53 gives the
arbitrators the power to interpret the rules, and therefore, determine what is material or relevant proof by majority vote. The
AAA will supply an interpretation if no majority is obtainable
upon submission by either the arbitrators or the parties.
B.

Pleading, Discovery, and Witnesses

Pleading practice under the three sets of institutional rules is
similar to that followed by United States courts. The claims are
to be brief, nonconclusory statements with supporting facts and
requests for specific relief.87 Although both the AAA and UNCITRAL rules expressly provide for amendments to the claims, the
differences in the working provisions of the three are worth investigating. Rule 8 of the AAA allows either party to make "any new
or different claim" and the opposing party to answer until the
arbitrator is appointed; after that time, the arbitrator's consent is
needed to make amendments to the claims. The UNCITRAL provisions for amendments to claims or defenses require that the arbitrator make a judgment on the appropriateness of the change
"having regard to the delay in making it or prejudice to the other
party or any other circumstances." 88 The arbitrator, therefore,

83. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.

84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. AAA Rules, supra note 18, rule 7(a); ICC Rules, supra note 18, art. 3(2);
UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 6, art. 18.
88. UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 6, art. 20.
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has a lot of discretion. In addition, changes under the UNCITRAL rules must fall within the scope of the arbitration clause or
separate arbitration agreement. To amend or change under the
rules of the ICC, a party must stay within the provisions of the
terms of reference, or petition the court for a rider to those
provisions.88
The parties should consider how much native procedure they
wish the arbitrator to bring to the arbitration and how much of
their own legal procedure they wish to incorporate. Considering
the latitude given the arbitrators under the rules, if the parties
feel that a particular procedure will enhance their case, they
should provide for it in the arbitration agreement. For United
States practitioners, the silence of the rules on matters such as
discovery may be a blessing or a tragedy. It is a blessing because
the lack of discovery will save time and money prior to the hearings. How often, however, will a party have all the evidence
needed to press a claim at the time the dispute arises? Will the
lack of discovery cripple a case considering that the rules of the
various institutions and UNCITRAL also provide for representation at the hearings by counsel? At the very least, consideration
of the problem at the outset may lead parties to take precautionary steps toward preserving evidence throughout the contractual
relationship. If arbitrators must conduct an extensive evidencecollecting process,90 their fees under any of the payment schedules will increase, their efficiency will diminish, and the proceeding will be prolonged.
The arbitrators are empowered to call expert witnesses themselves. This practice conforms to most civil law systems. Such experts are appointed by the tribunal, but are paid jointly by the
parties. The parties, however, may wish to call in their own experts. Witnesses may be examined by the arbitrators, by party
representatives, or even by the parties themselves. Under the
UNCITRAL and ICC rules, hearings may be omitted and the case
decided on documents alone." Under ICC rules, the parties must
89. ICC Rules, supra note 18, art. 16.

90. Under all of the rules, arbitrators are empowered to ask for the information they need to make a fair evaluation of the case before them. See, e.g., id.

art. 14; AAA Rules, supra note 18, rule 33; UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 6, art.
24(3).
91. UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 6, art. 15; ICC Rules, supra note 18, art.
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request that the hearings be omitted.9 2 Under UNCITRAL rules,
however, the parties must fail to request a hearing and the arbitrator must decide that the proceedings should continue on the
93
basis of the documents alone.
C.

Additional Considerations

Under the scope of powers given to the arbitrator in matters of
evidence, it is essential that if the parties wish to provide for certain procedures, they do so in their arbitration agreement. If the
parties fail to prescribe procedures at the time of selection, they
should pay attention to the professional habits of the arbitrator
because those habits will likely govern the procedure and presentation of evidence.
In framing the procedure to be followed by an arbitration tribunal, parties should not overemphasize speed at the expense of
fairness. Denying a claimant adequate opportunity to present his
case is a valid defense to the enforcement of the foreign arbitral
award in any of the countries that have signed the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards. The simplified procedures of arbitration actually
can leave more room to maneuver and disagree than do the more
comprehensive rules of judicial systems. The lack of settled procedure may lead to even greater delay because of the complicated
issues usually present in an international commercial dispute.
Moreover, it is unlikely that the lawyers involved in arbitration
will cease to fight over procedural rules "in the spirit of
arbitration."
VIII.

PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINATION OF APPLICABLE LAW

Under ICC and UNCITRAL rules, the parties may stipulate
the substantive law to be applied in arbitration. If the parties
have not designated the substantive law, the tribunal will apply
the conflict of law rules it deems applicable. 4 The AAA rules contain no provisions for determining applicable law. In practice, arbitrators often apply the substantive law of the country where the
arbitral tribunal is located or choose the law according to that
92.
93.
94.

art. 33.

ICC Rules, supra note 18, art. 14(3).
UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 6, art. 15(2).
ICC Rules, supra note 18, art. 13(2); UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 6,
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country's conflict of law rules. In deciding whether or not to specify applicable law, one must consider the extent to which any
choice will provide an opportunity for future litigation. This is
particularly important in the context of a reasoned award in
which the procedure provides for review by a court.
Another drafting issue is whether arbitrators will be empowered to act by provisions in the rules, by local law, or by custom
and habit as amiables compositeurs or ex aequo et bono. In addition, parties must determine whether or not the arbitrators
should apply any ascertainable lex mercatoria.These issues concern the power arbitrators have over the resolution of the dispute
and present both procedural and substantive problems or pitfalls.
The ICC rules grant an arbitrator the power to act as amiable
compositeur only if the parties have agreed to give him such authority9 5 Although this rule provides some protection against unpredictable legal standards, the arbitrator is additionally directed
to take account of relevant trade usages and provisions of the
contract at all times. 6 The AAA rules have no such provision,
leaving the decision on this question to either the parties or the
arbitrators. The provision in the UNCITRAL rules states: "The
arbitral tribunal shall decide as amiable compositeur or ex aequo
et bono only if the parties have expressly authorized the arbitral
tribunal to do so and if the law applicable to the arbitral procedure permits such arbitration.

' 97

The UNCITRAL rules also con-

tain a section that mirrors the ICC's provision for trade usage and
law of the contract.
IX.

THE AwARD

The relevant inquiry on the form and content of an award
should take into account the applicable law governing its enforcement. Beyond that, draftsmen should consider carefully whether
or not they want to have a reasoned award. Its advantages are
that parties will have the satisfaction of knowing the reasoning
behind the arbitrators' decision and guidelines for future conduct
95. ICC Rules, supra note 18, art. 13(4).
96. Id. art. 13(5).
97. UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 6, art. 33. The rules of the Stockholm
Chamber of Commerce, however, grant the arbitrator this broader power. Rules
of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (adopted
1976), rule 19, reprinted in I INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (Oceana)
part IV.B, at 77 (1979).
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in any ongoing or new contractual relationship. Because arbitration awards are confidential and not published in any organized
system of reporting precedent, their value to future arbitrations is
minimal at this time. The International Court of Arbitration,
however, reviews draft awards by the ICC and uses the reasoned
awards as guidelines, if not as formal precedent. In addition, the
ICC is currently examining the possibility of publishing anonymous excerpts of awards. The disadvantages, however, may override any of these considerations: a reasoned award may provide
specific grounds for a court to review and possibly refuse to enforce the award.
Other areas to consider are whether the award is to be a unanimous or a majority decision, and what provisions should be made
if the arbitrators cannot agree. The role of the presiding arbitrator and the amount of power he is to wield, is obviously of significance in the context of the award. Because the presiding arbitrator is generally appointed by the administrating body when
institutional rules are observed, he may have the final decision
under the applicable rules.
An award from the AAA is "in writing" and signed by the sole
arbitrator or by at least a majority of the arbitrators. 8 In contrast, the ICC rules, although not mentioning the form or substance of an award, provide for either a majority award or, in the
absence of a majority, an award to be made by the presiding arbitrator alone. 99 UNCITRAL arbitration provides for a majority decision; if the parties have left a "question of procedure" with respect to a lack of a majority, "the presiding arbitrator may decide
on his own, subject to revision, if any, by the arbitral tribunal." 10 0
One last measure to protect an award might be included in any
arbitration clause: if an award is not voluntarily complied with,
the parties must seek confirmation in a court of competent jurisdiction to arm themselves with a judgment that may be more easily enforced where the losing party has assets. A contract clause
giving consent to immediate entry and waiving rights to appeal
through any national court system may make the procedure of
confirmation proceed more smoothly.

98. AAA Rules, supra note 18, rule 42.
99. ICC Rules, supra note 18, art. 19.
100. UNCITRAL Rules, supra note 6, art. 31(2).
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CONCLUSION

It is clear from the preceding overview of the rules of the most
well-known arbitral institutions that it is impossible to consider
any provision in isolation. The success of any arbitral proceeding
grows out of the final mix of provisions. Curing the defects of a
single rule might throw off the balance ostensibly achieved by the
rules as a whole. Even worse, such stop-gap measures might lull a
party into a false sense of security if the ideal arbitrator is forced
by another rule of the institution or by some quirk buried in local
law to render a long, detailed award that is unenforceable in any
country holding the opponent's assets or ripe for judicial challenge in a host of national courts.
Counsel cannot draft against every possible contingency or be
an expert on each facet of all questions. Blindly choosing a set of
institutional rules, however, can lead to serious problems. A personalized checklist of considerations, dependent on the needs and
goals of a particular client, may be helpful to counsel. In addition,
acquiring a familiarity with one institution's rules and drafting
possible tailored provisions to cure any given situation is a task of
manageable proportions. Such a checklist might include:
(1) Scope of arbitration clause:
(a) Broad: any and all disputes arising out of or relating to
this agreement;
(b) Narrow: only specific disputes.
(2) The number of arbitrators and method of their selection,
with participation in the process reserved for the parties.
(3) Qualifications of arbitrators (technical, legal, business) and
whether they may act as amiables compositeurs or ex aequo et
bono.
(4) Languages for arbitrators, documents, submissions, proceedings: if possible designate only one language to keep costs down.
(5) The location for arbitration, considering applicable local arbitration law, availability of qualified local counsel, availability of
secretarial or administrative staff including interpreters, and costs
including transportation and housing.
(6) Form of the award: reasoned or not, by majority or unanimity (provisions for lack of unanimity), availability of dissenting
opinions.
(7) Possibility of consent to immediate entry of judgment in a
court of competent jurisdiction and a waiver of any or all rights to
appeal in any national court system.
Although by no means exhaustive, this checklist should be a
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useful starting point for the study of an arbitral institution's rules
and a basis upon which to negotiate changes.

